Modular Belief Updates and Confusion about Measures of Certainty in
  Artificial Intelligence Research by Horvitz, Eric J. & Heckerman, David
Modular Belief Updates and Confusion about 
Measures of Certainty in Artificial Intelligence Research • 
Eric Horvitz and David Heckermau • • 
Medical Computer Sc:lence Group 
Knowledce Systems Laboratory, TCJ35 SUMC, Stanford University 
Abstract 
Over the last decade, there has been growing 
Interest. In the use or measures or thangc In belief ror 
reasoning with uncertainty In artlrlclal Intelligence 
researt'h. An Important characteristic or several 
methodologies that reason wlt.b changes In belief or 
belief updates, Is a property that we term 
modularit11. We call updates that !atisfy thl! 
property modular update.. Whereas probabilistic 
measures or belld update • wblcb satisfy the 
modularity property were first discovered In tb"e 
nlneternth t'f'nt.ury, knowledge and discussion or 
t.hese quantities remains obsrure In artlflc.-lal 
lnlelll&enre research. \Ve define modular updates 
and dl�russ their Inappropriate use In two Influential 
expert systems. 
lntroduc:tloD 
• .Most work In reasoning about uncertainty bas c:eutered on the 
manipulation or measurrs or. d•olutc belief. That Is, most 
methods for managing uncertainty c:oncern themselves wltb 
quenlons of the form. Given current evidence, bow certain Is 
some b�·potbesls! Although more obscure, there has been 
lnvtstli�ntlon Into the U!e or me3.Surrs or change In belief. Here. 
qutstlons are or the form. Given a piece or evidence, bow bas 
the certainty or some hypothesis changed! The distinction 
between rea.sotllng with quantities representing changes In belief 
and reasoning wltb quantities representltlg absolute measures of 
belief 15 significant In the design and characterization of 
methods for handling uncertainty In reasoning systems. 
In this paper, we rorus on measures or change In belld �bat 
satisfy a special proper�y tha� we call modulorit11. We will 
define modularl�y and describe quanmles c�lled morlulor 
update•. Modular updates are central t.o t.be Intent or several 
methodologies for reasoning under uncertainty In expert 
systems. We will discuss �wo medical expert systems, MYCIN 
and INTERNIST-I and show that both sYStems bave Implicitly 
assumed modularity In reasoning with uncertainty. Finally, we 
argue that MYCIN and INTERNIST-I have used Inappropriate 
measures or belld update. 
DeltDltlon of a modular update 
In this senlon, we rormall:r.e tbe concept or a modular update. 
Before we examine tbe notion or modularity, le\ us define what 
we mean by au uprlGte. Informally, a belle! update represents 
the change of belief In some hypothesis clven a piece or 
evidence. Thb must be contrasted with the notion or absolute 
belief In a b)'pothesis given evidence. We shall assume In �hi! 
paper, t.bat belief Is a continuous, ordered quantity. That Is, It 
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mak�s sen.!e to talk about a tlcfrce or bellet and to say that one 
belief Is strongtr than another. We Insist that beller updates 
are al!o continuous and ordered. In addition. the combination 
or two updates which correspond to two different pieces or 
evid••nre should Itself be an update. Before tbls basic upd3.te 
pr�perty Is stated formally, It should be realized thai updating 
a beller In a hypothtsls H ginn some evidence E may depend oo 
p:-ior e\"ldenre for the bypot hesis. Therefore. update! logically 
mu!t haw thrre ar'uments: a hypothesis H. new evidence E. 
and prior evldenrt e. \\'ltb thl!, we formally capture the notion 
or an updatr by ln!istlng that there Is some runctlou • such 
that 
(!) 
where t'(H.E1.e) denotes the update on H given E1 and prior 
evldtnre e. l'(H,E:.E1e) denotes the update on H given E: and 
prior evidence E1 and e, and U{H.E1E2.e) denotes the combined 
upd:�te 'Inn prior e\"ldeuce e. 
Now we lntroduC'e the formal concept or modularity. ·we say 
that an upd:�te Is modular. If the update Is Independent or prior 
eYident'e. Form:�lly, 
U(H,E,e) � U(H,E.t) &i U(H,E} (2) 
\'l.'e not.e that the notion or modularity Is not new. For 
�x:�mple. Informal notions of modularity bave been a central 
theme In the MYCIN expert system project1• 
As!umlng mod•Jiarity or belief updates may or may not be 
reasonable depending on the nature or dependencies within the 
domain or lntert!t. However. the property Is often assumed in 
expert system researC'h to eliminate the need to consider 
possible complex Interactions among e\'ldence. The modularity 
property thereby eases the task or knowledge acquisition and 
explanation. facilitates the construction and maintenance or 
knowledge bases and allows the use of relatively simple 
runetlons for belltr updating. The desirability or these features 
makes It tempting to use the modularity assumption even wben 
It Is Inappropriate. 
History and derlvatloD of a modular update 
The first modular update was proposed In 1878 by Pelrce2• 
Tbls quantity, which be called "weight of evidence," Is equal to 
the logarithm or a rr.tlo or conditional probabilities commonly 
called the likelihood ratio. Several other researchers 
Independently disC'overed this simple but powerful me�ure of 
change In belief. Tbey Include Turlng1, Good4 and Minsky and 
Seltrldges. To see that thlll quantity Is a modular upd:lle, first 
consider Ba�·es· Theorem for evidence E and hypothesis H: 
p(E He)p(Hie) 
: ----------........ 
P (E i e) 
p(HIEe) 
Tbr rorrr!pondlng formula Cor tbe negation or the hypothesis. 
-H. Is 
P(WHe)p(-Hje) 
p(-H]Ee) : -----·-······-­
p(Eie) 
Di\'ldlng tbe two. Wf crt 
P(H[Ee) P(E!He} p(Hje) 
·-----·- = ---··--- ··-----
p{"HiEe) p(Ej·He) p(-Hje) 
The quantity 
P(EIHe) 
P(WHe) 
(3) 
Is called tbe likelihood ratio, and Is written >.(H,E,e). To see 
that >. 15 an update by definition (1 ), consider Bayes' theorem 
for two pieces of t'\'ldence: 
p("HjE1Ez) P(E1��·H) p("H) P(�j-HE1) p(E1j"H) p(•H) 
Thtrdore. by tbe definition or >. we see that 
>.(H,E1� .e) z >.(H.E,.f1e) >.(H,E1,e). 
(s) 
(6) 
In particular, >. Is a probabilistic update with the update 
romblnatlon function.#. being simple multiplication. 
If we assume that evidence for a bypothesl5 15 conditionally 
lndeptndent on the hypothesl5 and Its negation. then 
>.(H,E,e): >.(H,f,e). (7) 
In otber words, t-he likelihood ratio Is a modular update wben 
condltl�na.l lndtpendence Is a.ssumed. 
Note that with this a.ssuJIJJ)tlon, the combination of tbe 
update loc(>.l takes on the simple form 
la&(>.(H,£1 . . .  fa)} :o .t1 IOC[>.(H.ft)). 
Petree referred to these modular updates as •weights of 
nldenrr• because they are added just as wel�ts on a scale. 
Peirce argued that logfXI 15 a usetul probab1115tlc quantity Cor 
acquiring and making Inferences with uncertainty. 
Historical confusion about absolute beller and 
beller updates 
The· usr of wtll·characterlzed updates In reasoning systems 
ba.s bern rart. Only a few systems have accurately manipulated 
wtll-undtrst.ood measures or change In belief (e.g., the 
GL.-\SGOW DYSPEPSIA system, using the measure 
ln>.((H.E)J1). One explanation for the Infrequent and often 
Inappropriat-e use or measures or chance In belief Is that 
di!!<'U!!Ion or tht quant.lt.lts Is rtlatlvely obscure; treatises on 
probability theory often focus solely oa the use or absolute 
mt�urts of belief In lnfer�ntlal reasoning. Another reason may 
bt related to p�t coaru�lon about the relatloosblp of belief 
updates and a.b301ute belief In the literature. 
Confusion surrounding the relationship of measures of 
ab!Oiute belld and belief updates surfaced In discussions In the 
mld·twentleth crntury as res�archers began to rediscover tbe 
subjtctlv� Interpretation of probabilities. 'Whereas Bayes 
proposed probability as a personal measure of belief over two 
hundred years aco. the tarly twentieth century was marked by 
the rlst of tbe Interpretation of probabilities as frequencies. 
Alt-hough tbe frtqutncy Interpretation of probability Is still 
quite popular, the early lg30's saw a "rediscovery" or 
probability as a measure of personal bellef7. Among others. 
Ramsey. Savage. Carnap, and DIFenettt led tbl5 redl5covery. 
Carnap originally lntroduc�d tbe phrase. degree of 
ronfirmation In his classic work. Logical Foundation� of 
Pro6a6ilit118• primarily to dlstln,ulsh · the subjective 
lnterprttatlon of probabilities from the classical Crequtncy 
Interpretation. \\'bile Carnap's original intent was noble, he 
and others began to use degree or conflrmatloo.to represeot two 
very dlfftrent conctpts. \\'hereas be used degree or 
connrmat.ion to denote what is now commonly called subjective 
probability, bt also used tbe phrase to ref�r to change in belier. 
Mnnwhile, within tbe philosophy of science literature. Popper8 
lntroductd torroboration. his term for a clearly defined 
measure or changt' In belief based on a combination of 
probabiiiEtlt' quantities. In trying to disentangle terminolo�t.Y 
about measures of chance In belief. Popper pointed out 
problems with Carnap's Inconsistent use or the wor� 
conflrm:�tlon. Much confusion bad already prollfnated by tlle 
time Carnap apolocized tor his wavering use of terminology io 
the second of edition of bls book10• 
We note that tbe quantities defined by Popper are very 
similar to Petree's "w�lghts or evidence." In fact. In 1960. 
Good showed that tbe loc·llkellbood ratio satisfies a slightly 
modified version of Popper's :uioms or corroboratlonll. 
Wt believe that confusion in the mid-twentieth century about 
ttrms such as confirmation and corroboration and poor 
understandlnc or their relevance to measures or chance In belief 
might lnd�ed br rontrlbuting factors to more recent confusion 
surrounding 1 he us� or modular belief updates versus absolute 
bellt'f in marhine intelligence research. 
Modular updates ln MYCIN 
MYCJN. EMYCJN, and Its descendants have reasoned with 
measur�s of changes In belief called certainty factors (CF's). 
MYCIN's knowledge Is represented as rulu in tbe rorm or 
IF E THEN H where H Is a hypothesis and E is evidence bavlng 
relt\'ance to the hypotl)esls. A certainty !actor' Is associated 
with tach MYCIN rule. CF's were deslcned as measures or 
thangc In belief about a hypothesis clven some evidence12. The 
quantities ranee between ·l and l; positive numbers correspood 
to an incrcue In belief In a hypothesis wblle negative quantities 
correspond to a decrca.c In belief wben certain evidence 
becomes available. 
Often In MYCI�. srveral pieces of evidence are reiHant to 
the samt hypotheses. Thus. tbe creators of tbe CF model 
denloptd methods for tom6ining certainty factors. In tbe 
original work. they presented a function for calculating an 
errecti\'e certainty Cact.or for two pieces or f\'ldence In terms or 
ctrtalnty factors for each piece of evidence separately. That is. 
they as!umed the basic update property, (1 ). Furthermore. 
tht'y Implicitly assumed that the CF quantity satisfied tbe 
modularity property (:!). by writing certaloty factors as a 
Cunrtlon of only H and E. 
Now let us ronslder the original definition of certainty 
factors: 
p(HJE) • p(H) 
P(HIE) > P(H} -·-··--------
1 · p(H) 
CF(H.E} � (e) 
p(H�E} • p(H) 
p(H) > p(HIE) --+•�----·-·· 
p(H) 
This dfflnltlon clearly demonstrates that certainty factors are 
lnttnded to reprucnt chan,es In belief. However, there arc 
problems with the dtflnltlon. First. we shall show that malclll& 
the assumpc ion or eondlc.loDal IDdtpeDdeDce or evlde11ce given H 
and -H Is Inconsistent wltb the modularity axiom. We find 
tbls lnronslstency to be UDrea.so11able as u. Is Impossible to 
capture complex lnuractloDs among evlde11ce ror hypotheses 
wheD modularity Is assumed. Second, we shall show that, In 
certain sltuatloDs, the modularity axiom Implies marginal 
independence which Is unacceptable as It makes updatllll 
Impossible. 
Consider the natural extensloD of the certainty factor 
deOnllloD to Include prior evidence: 
p{HIEe) - P(H!e) 
I • p(H ie) 
p{HIEe) > p{Hie) 
CF(H,E,e) = (9) 
p(Hie) > P(HIEe) 
p(H!Ee) - p(Hje) 
·---------------
P{Hie) 
l'nder the a.ssumpt1o11 or co11dltlonal Independence or evidence 
glnD H and -H. It can be shown by counterexample that the 
abovt CF dtriDilloo does not satisfy the modularity property, 
(�). In particular. consider updates where 
p(H) : .01, 
X(H,E1) = 99, and 
>.(H.�) &,99 
In this cue It Is easy to show that 
CF(H,£1 •• ) -. 5 and 
CF(H,E1.�) ..,. 1 
Indeed, assuming condltloul Independence leads to a violation 
or the modularity axiom. 
We now coDSider the ddlnltloD of certainty factors 111 a 
limiting c�e. In rac:t, this situation was discussed In the 
original work In a sec:t1o11 c:oncernlng the elicitation or certal11ty 
factors rrom cxperts12: 
We 110ttd earlier that experts arc often wlllln& to 
state de&rees or belld In terms or tODdltlonal 
probabilities (p(HIE>l .••. IL Is perhaps reveal111g to 
note, therrfore. tbat wheD tbe a priori belief Is small 
(I.e., p(H) Is clast to z:ero). the CF of � hypothesis 
eonflrmtd by evidence Is approximately equal to Its 
conditional probabUU.y on that evidence: 
p(HIE) - p{H) 
CF(H.E) a ···--·------- .._ p(HIE) 
1 • p(H) 
Tbls observation suggests tbat coDrlrmatlon, to 
the extent that It Is adequately represented by CF's, 
Is close \o conditional probability (In certain cases). 
altbough It still defies analysis as a. probability 
measure. 
The authors are saying tbat the posterior probability or H 
given E Is approximately equal to the certainty factor ror H and 
E (a modular update) when p(H} Is small. Note that. If tbls 
argumtnt Is applied to tbe definition of certainty factors 
extended to IDcludc prior evidence, we get 
CF(H,E,e) .,_ p(H[Ee) when p(HJe) .,_ 0. 
Howtver, (!!) with E = e then Implies that 
p(H ic) = p(H) 
That Is, evldenre and hypotheses arc marginally Independent. 
Using tbe limiting value or the CF dertnillon as an 
approximation for a modular belief update Implies that evidence 
can have no Impact on belief 111 hypotheses. Given such a 
result. It Is surprising tbat tbe ori&IDal definition or certainty 
factors was not questioned. Unrort.unat.cly, In the case or 
MYCIN, tbls problem Jed to the elicitation or absolute 
quantities 111 \leu or updatest'. We note here that It Is possible 
to fl11d updates which are runcllo11s or the prior and posterior 
probabilities, In the spirit or (8). wblcb are modular. These 
qua11tltles are closely related to the likelihood ratio >.14• 
Modular updates in INTERNIST·l 
INTERNIST·! was the result of a major research project to 
build an expert system for Internal medicine diagnosis. The 
sysum uses 111 ad hoc: methodology for reasoning UDder 
uncertainty. The method ror mana&ID& UDcertaiDtY In 
INTERNIST·! Is associated with similar problems with 
modularity. In fact, INTERNIST-I. like MYCIN, uses 
quantities ellc:lted as absolute measures of belief In a 
methodolog,v that lmpllrltly assumes they are modular updates. 
The creators or INTERNIST·l elicited measures or belief from 
experts called et•oHng •trength•. Evoking strellgths can take 
on Integer \'alues between 0 and 5. An IDformal dertnitioD Is 
assorlated with tarh or these \'alucs. For example, an evoking 
strength or 1 means that the "diagnosis (or the disease In 
questloDIIs a rare or unusual cause or the listed manifestation." 
AD evoking strc-ngtb or 3 meaDs that the "diagnosis Is the most 
common but not the overwhelmln& cause or listed 
manifestation." And an evoking stren,th of S means that the 
"llSttd m3nlrestation is pathognomonic ror tlmpiJeatesJ tjle 
dlsea,c." 
E•;oklng strengths are elirited In quite the same way as 011e 
would elicit the posterior probability p(HIE). The measure is 
vltwtd as an an!wer to tbe questloD •Given a patient with this 
rlndln,. how strongly should I consider this diagnosis to be its 
explan3tlon7"16 In fact. e\·oklng strengths are described as 
brln& "somewhat analogous to a posterior probability. "18 
In INTERl':IST-1. evoking strengths are u�ed 111 determining 
tht •srorts• ror dlseast hypotheses. A disease's score. in turD. 
rough!)' reflec-ts the belief that it Is present in a patie11t: a high 
score Is assoc:lated with a likely disease hypothe.:sls. The score 
ror a disease Is computed In part by summing evoking 
strength,. This strongly suggests that these quaDtltl!s are 
Intended to be updates a.s defllltd by the basic update property 
(1 ). Furthermore, evoking strengths are o11ly a fUDctlon or the 
two arguments H and E. Tberdore. INTERNIST·l researchers 
also Implicitly assumed that evoking stre11gths satisfy the 
modularitY property (2). However, as 111 MYCIN. the 
assumptloD that p(HIEe) is a modular update leads to the 
unacC'eptable rc:�ult that evidence aDd hypotheses are 
marginally Independent. 
Summaey and c:onc:lusions 
We ban formally defined the property of modularity With 
rrsptct to measures or change In belief, which we call modular 
update.. As we bave discussed, modular updates were 
Introduced In tbe nineteenth century !Jut have remained 
obscure In comparison with tbe more familiar use or absolute 
measures or belief ID rea.so11lng under unc:ertalnty. We have 
argued t-bat two plausible reasoning systems have used 
IDapproprlatc: measures or belief ill systems that assume tbe 
modularity property. It Is Important that measures or belief or 
belief update are combined In a way eonslstellt with their 
rllcltaUon from experc.s lest srrlous flaws In reuontn& may 
result. We rind confusion about modular updates In two 
Influential systems to be troublln&. We believe that future 
syst.ems would brndlt from explicit consideration of the 
properties and requirements a.5soclated wltb tbe use or modular 
belief updates In plausible rea.sonlnc. 
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